Received: from localhost by CS.UTK.EDU with SMTP (cf v2.9s-UTK) id TAA27913; Wed, 28 Feb 1996 19:43:24 -0500 Received: by CS.UTK.EDU (bulk_mailer v1.4); Wed, 28 Feb 1996 19:39:28 -0500 Received: from koobera.math.uic.edu by CS.UTK.EDU with SMTP (cf v2.9s-UTK) id TAA27574; Wed, 28 Feb 1996 19:39:18 -0500 Received: (qmail-queue invoked by uid 666); 29 Feb 1996 00:41:04 GMT Date: 29 Feb 1996 00:41:04 GMT Message-ID: <19960229004104.17097.qmail@koobera.math.uic.edu> From: djb@koobera.math.uic.edu (D. J. Bernstein) To: drums@cs.utk.edu Subject: comments from a newcomer I found draft-ietf-drums-smtpupd-01 a few days ago. A few comments. > [[Note in draft: Keith and Ned suggest that we should invent a new > error code to be sent by the server when it shuts down the connection > because it has timed out waiting for a client command and that it > should be a 5yz code (since nothing temporary is happening). Are you people actively _trying_ to cause reliability problems? Imagine, for example, that a RCPT packet is delayed; the server times out; and the server sends 555 TIMEOUT. Would you say that ``nothing temporary is happening''? In fact, since a typical SMTP client doesn't pay attention to incoming data until it's sent a command, it's hard to imagine how your proposed timeout code could ever _avoid_ incorrectly bouncing mail! > MUST NOT transmit messages with information in the high-order bit Why not? If you're updating the SMTP spec, how about bringing it in line with reality by dropping the 7-bit restriction? Europeans transmit 8-bit messages all the time. The current 7-bit restriction produces a blatant---and entirely artificial---conflict between ``be liberal with what you accept'' and ``be conservative with what you send.'' > clients SHOULD preferentially utilize EHLO SMTP is already painfully slow; it'll be many years before most servers support ESMTP. Why not standardize the convention of putting " ESMTP" into the greeting line to indicate that EHLO is acceptable? > Implementations MAY make provision for SMTP servers to be > configured to disable the software and version announcement where it > causes security concerns. ``Where it causes security concerns'' is EVERYWHERE. Anyone who controls a DNS server can, right now, break into practically every machine on the net that runs sendmail. > Loop detection by examination of Received fields See ftp://koobera.math.uic.edu/pub/docs/RFCLOOPS for how to do it right. ---Dan